

the
integration
model



Doubtless many short term visitors to the Republic of South Africa would advocate deliberate *integration* of Black and White as the obvious answer to the country's group relations problem. Integration in this sense may be broadly defined as a conscious effort to effect socio-political integration of the South African masses ostensibly for the sake of the ideology of majority rule.

Such first impressions are not surprising for, to the casual observer, population movements and economic conditions in the major cities appear not much different from those of other major world centres with sizeable Black and White communities.

Other visitors, while not proposing any alternative policy, nonetheless maintain that separate development is negative, full of imperfections, harsh, ultra-regulatory and even fraught with danger. These observations can also be found in books and studies on South African race relations and today form the basis of most general, and even specialised, evaluations of the South African situation. These observations do not arise from a real in-depth knowledge of the deep-rooted socio-political and ethnic realities of South Africa but spring instead from an identification with race relations at home, whether in the US, parts of Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Japan or the Netherlands.

The policy most often proposed as an alternative to separate development is the socio-political integration of all the peoples in South Africa. The short-term model of such a programme is advocated by the majority of African states, normally on the basis of one-man one-vote, or popularly known as "majority rule". The long term model relates not to colour, but to *merit* in forming the basis of political rights. In both versions, however, the vision is one in which *ultimately* all people in South Africa are seen as

inter-changeable units, devoid of any race, historical or cultural consciousness, and assimilable in a new common culture with a common group loyalty.

The foregoing vision contains much commendable idealism and is probably in line with the so-called majority opinion in the world. It is an uncomplicated formula, uncluttered by ethnic, social, economic or group political considerations. It is an easy and simple policy to sell and expound and can therefore be readily appreciated by the masses. Superficially it is a neat and tidy package requiring only a Bill of Rights and a guaranteed constitution with checks and balances to provide for the aspirations of all individuals and groups resident in South Africa, irrespective of race, ethnicity, sex or religion.

The South African Government and its supporters are committed to a model based on the separate political development of the country's disparate population groups. It concedes, however, that the other model, a closely integrated society, is advanced as a clear cut, radical alternative and therefore also requires in-depth consideration. Apart from the mandate it has received from the electorate to pursue a policy of separate development, the government has in fact evaluated and rejected this alternative, not for emotional or racialistic reasons, but on practical grounds and because of major flaws in the integration model.

While visitors to South Africa who have interested themselves in the race and group relations aspects have often been severely critical of the structure and ideology of separate development, or of its application in practice, there has been a singular lack of penetrating criticism directed at the integration model. It is of course human (and easier) to prefer criticism of an existing social structure and policy, but the integration

THE SETTLEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA: THE MOVEMENT OF THE RACES INTO THE INTERIOR

The present population of South Africa is heterogeneous and multinational. It consists of a White nation, a Coloured group of mixed descent, Asians and the following Bantu (Black) peoples: Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana, North Sotho, South Sotho, Tsonga (Shangaan), Swazi and Venda. (Two minor Bantu groups are the South Ndebele and North Ndebele.) By every ethnological yardstick such as culture, origin, language and way of life the Black peoples constitute different nations.

Most of the Whites are descendants of Dutch, French, British and German pioneers with smaller admixtures of other European peoples — mainly Portuguese, Greeks and Italians.

Western civilisation was first brought to South Africa by the Dutch who settled at the Cape in 1652, not many years after the founding of New York in America. The French Huguenots who arrived in 1688 were soon assimilated by the Dutch. In 1820 about 5 000 British settlers came to the Cape. The fourth significant group of settlers, the Germans, came to South Africa between 1848 and 1858. These were the ancestors of the White South African nation, which today is a nation in its own right with distinctive cultural characteristics. The language of the majority, Afrikaans, is the only recognised Germanic language ever to evolve in Africa.


The Bantu (Black) peoples are primarily of mixed Hamitic and Negroid descent. Several centuries ago they migrated southwards in three main streams from the vicinity of the Great Lakes in Central Africa. One group settled in the Congo River Basin, in Angola and further south. The second group (Sotho) finally settled in Lesotho, Botswana, parts of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and the northern Cape Province. The third group (Nguni) migrated down the eastern seaboard to Natal and the eastern Cape Province. The first appreciable contact between the southward moving Blacks and the already established White community took place only 120 years after the first Whites landed in the south at a point some 1 000 km north-east of Cape Town.

Despite frontier wars during the 18th and 19th centuries, the Whites and the Blacks by and large retained possession of the respective White and Black homelands into which the country had come to be divided as a result of this process of migration and settlement.

Asians (predominantly Indian) first came to South Africa in 1860 to work as indentured labourers on the sugar plantations of Natal under an arrangement sponsored by the British Government. They were followed by Indian traders, merchants and craftsmen who came on their own initiative.

Between 1850 and 1900 Britain's expansion of its Empire in Africa led to the inclusion of all White and Black areas in what was then known as British South Africa.

From the foregoing it is evident that neither the White nation nor the various Black nations have any prior claim to all of South Africa, except to those areas which they settled by right of first occupation. It is also evident that the Black people do not form a homogeneous society. The fact that different nations live within the same borders in South Africa today is a legacy of British Colonial policy.



MAP 1
THE MOVEMENT
OF THE RACES
INTO THE INTERIOR
OF SOUTH AFRICA

model, untried and untested in conditions similar in most respects to those pertaining to South Africa, is nonetheless seriously proposed by a majority of the nations represented in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Integration is seen as the only key to South Africa's re-admission to the International Labour Organisation, the International Olympic Movement and other organisations from which South Africa has been forced to withdraw because of its policy of separate development. It is therefore incumbent upon these and other organisations, in fact all who actively criticise and oppose separate development, also to study the flaws in the integration model and the consequences of its impracticability.

Without a working knowledge of Black Africa's political history and ethnology, and the socio-political factors which have played the major role in the rise of nations and states elsewhere in the world, even a 5 000 page treatise of the flaws of the integration model would be unconvincing, for neither the model of separate development nor that of integration can be evaluated in a vacuum. For this reason certain basic considerations in the evaluation of both the integration model and the separate development model are necessary.

Firstly: In spite of the post-war migratory surge to the cities and the impact of Western influences on Black culture, South Africa's population is far from being a homogeneous mass. According to the standards applied by the first United Nations Congress on the Multinational Society (Yugoslavia 1965) or in terms of the definition of a plural society as set, for example, by Holland's Foundation for the Study of Plural Societies (The Hague), South Africa is definitely a multi-national and plural society inhabited by disparate peoples of whom the Zulu, Xhosa, Whites, Coloureds (of mix-

ed descent) and Tswanas are the major components.

Secondly: It bears repeating that historically not one of the major (or lesser) groups has an exclusive or prior claim to all of South African territory but each group has a moral, historical, legal and constitutional claim to at least a part of the country. (See Map 1)

Thirdly: The White nation cannot return to a European fatherland in the same way as, for example, the Dutch returned to the Netherlands after the independence of Indonesia. After 320 years they know only one homeland, South Africa, and even the language used by the majority of the Whites (Afrikaans) was evolved in Africa, not in Europe. The White South African nation has earlier origins than the White nations of Australia and New Zealand, dating back to about the same time as the origin of the Canadian and American White nations. White South Africans were ruling themselves long before either Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia were even established.

Fourthly: Various nations find themselves within South Africa's borders not by choice but as a legacy of British imperialism which turned this part of Africa into one multi-national state. More or less the same happened in India (now Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylon and India), the West Indies, Malaya (now Malaysia and Singapore) and the Central African Federation, today Zambia, Malawi and Rhodesia.

In the light of these realities, which any responsible administration must perforce take into consideration, the integration model is doomed to failure especially because of the following:

1. The policy of political integration of White and Black and of one-man one-vote, especially the franchise system based on voting rights according to merit, has been rejected by virtually

every state in Africa. Not only have White people but also non-Whites discovered this. For what reason, therefore, should the Black nations in South Africa act any differently? Why should they be the only Black people in Africa voluntarily to submit to partnership and equal sharing of power when simple arithmetic shows that they could grasp, consolidate and retain power on the majority principle thus rendering the White nation a politically impotent minority like the Asians in Uganda? What special characteristics do the Black people of South Africa possess which would enable them to cast aside their own racial, cultural, ethnic and religious feelings when all other Black nations in Africa have failed to do so? The peoples of Bangladesh, Pakistan and India could not do so. Nor, apparently, can the people in Ireland, Belgium and Cyprus. The White nation, on the other hand, has enjoyed a democratically elected Parliament since 1910 with an independent judiciary, a civil service based on the British model and a free press. Most of the governments of South Africa of the past 60 years could have been unseated by a 10 per cent swing in the popular vote, sometimes by as little as a one per cent swing. What- ever may be said of South Africa the White nation enjoys a sound two party political system no better but no worse than the great majority of Western democracies. Is this system compatible with Black African ideals, requirements and experience? The answer can be found in the 32 *coups d'etat* which have disrupted Black Africa over the past 12 years and led to a blanket of one-party states stretching from Cairo to Lusaka, in which, all too often, power resides in only one of several tribes or power elites.

2. The integration model would be rejected by the smaller Black ethnic groups because they would be left entirely at the mercy of the numerically

stronger Black groups and the White nation. (Ethnologically speaking the latter is numerically the strongest group after the Zulu.) Only a few generations ago the forefathers of many of the smaller Black units were being slaughtered in their hundreds of thousands by the Zulu and Matabele armies. While many individuals may thus be prepared to accept integration, the communities, as such, would not. (It is a superficial argument to say that in America millions of Italians have become Americans. The important fact is that the Italian nation in Italy is not likely to accept cultural and political integration with any other state, just as the Zulu nation in Zululand is not likely to accept fusion even if many thousands of individual Zulus are prepared to do so.) The Herero in South West Africa have a patriarchal and matriarchal system so that a Herero can only be born a Herero. He cannot become one by marriage. They have a strong "Herrenvolk" mentality but number only seven per cent of the population of South West Africa. The Herero masses will never accept, through a plebiscite, integration with the Ovambo who outnumber them fourteen to one.

3. The integration model is totally unacceptable to almost the entire White nation. This is a fact which cannot be wished away; nor the fact that they wield the political and economic power and are numerically the second strongest nation in South Africa. The South African political party which advocates political integration based on the concept of merit, received scarcely three per cent of the vote at the last general election. For all practical purposes this is an overwhelming rejection of the concept of integration.

4. The policy of integration is not acceptable to the masses of the major Black nations. At the last general election in the Transkei (homeland of the

Would they, after integration, react any differently to political frustration than their kinsmen in the now defunct Central African Federation?

In the integration model the Zulu politician will have to compete for a place in the sun against politicians from seven or eight other Black groups, as well as White politicians. The world knows how in certain societies with a multi-racial population, as distinct from a multi-national one, the non-White politician has a torrid time working his way up despite an elaborate structure of laws to protect him. In the model of separate development he has only to compete with his own people, in his own area and in his own language. Even the shepherd boy on the hills overlooking the Transkeian capital, Umtata, can dream of the day when he is Prime Minister of his own land. In the integration model he will have to destroy his cultural make-up and personality in order to wage a battle in a field crammed with competitors from other groups.

9. The integration model will run up against serious language, religious and legal problems. Serious social clashes have occurred in several societies on the question of languages — for example in Ceylon and Belgium. Despite a largely homogeneous society, with no question of race involved, the island known as Ireland and inhabited only by Irishmen is still a divided land because of religious differences. If, in addition, the Protestants in Ireland had been Black and the Catholics White, is there a reasonable man anywhere who would not concede that the problem would have become infinitely more complicated? And if the White Protestants spoke Hebrew and the Black Catholics Arabic would it not have bedevilled the situation beyond the point of redemption? Similarly, South Africa with its disparate peoples, different races, historical lineages and lan-

guages would be the last place in the world where an integration model could succeed. In addition, the cultural differences involved are staggering. In some cases 2 000 years of development separate people and make meaningful communication virtually impossible. The English-speaking White South African can use an unabbreviated general dictionary with as many as 750 000 entries. In the Bushman's language one can count only to "three". Any amount above three is designated by the word "many". Given the fact that there are a dozen major languages and two thousand religious sects in South Africa, while human development, at least by Western standards, spans the Stone Age to the Nuclear Age, the integration model will be confronted with insurmountable inbuilt obstacles. The integration model would have to cope with the fact that there are traditional Bantu laws, recognised as such by the state, and Roman-Dutch law. In the egalitarian society of the integrated state this could create serious problems. What will become of Bantu custom? Who will tell the Black man he may no longer take more than one wife? And if this is not done some White men may very well complain of racial discrimination in favour of Blacks.

10. If history has any meaning or any precept then mankind's entire past is a warning against attempts to enforce integration upon the peoples and races in South Africa. Never in history has any people voluntarily sacrificed its language, customs, culture, standard of living, or its legal, constitutional and historical rights for the sake of an ideology that has nowhere been applied with any appreciable success in societies segmented by deep social and racial differences. No other people or nation has ever made, or will ever make, such a sacrifice voluntarily in similar or even related conditions.

ern Rhodesia and Nyasaland — to establish a one-man one-vote multi-racial social system and parliament along the lines advocated for South Africa by the Afro-Asian world and a considerable number of Western States. In his famous speech before the South African Parliament on "The Winds of Change in Africa" the then British Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Macmillan, observed that the world should not preach to South Africa but set an example. This, he said, would happen in the Central African Federation. Within a few years however, the Federation was in ruins, split into three states: Malawi, Zambia and Rhodesia.

The reasons for the collapse of the Federation are precisely the same as those which would wreck racial partnership and integration in South Africa, namely, Black and White race consciousness, White and Black nationalism, incompatible socio-cultural systems, the threat to minorities, Black demands for self-determination, for the retention of their own identity, for opportunities to make their own mistakes and achieve their own victories in their own way.

Whoever tries to sell integration to Black and White leaders in South Africa will first have to prove that the Central African Federation never existed, nor India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Scandinavia, Malaysia — nor even the whole of Europe for that matter.

8. Now that numerically weaker countries within Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) — some with a smaller land area and a smaller gross domestic product than the embryonic Black states in the Republic of South Africa — have already achieved independence, the Zulu, Xhosa, Tswana and other Black nations in South Africa can hardly be expected to settle for less or to share political power with seven other groups remaining in South Africa.

World War Two — should integrate; on the contrary, the world has accepted two sovereign Germans. To think that in South Africa one can ignore similar political realities in favour of fine-sounding phrases, such as "an integrated society based on merit alone", is to turn one's back on a world which has never allowed itself to be laced into a straight-jacket of universal formulas and slogans. Cyprus has been given a theoretically watertight checks and balances constitution to bring about peaceful co-existence — not even integration — of two Mediterranean type peoples; yet a UN peace force cannot be withdrawn from the island. There has been no serious attempt to integrate Canada with the US. The world is quite happy to accept two Germans, two Koreans, two Vietnams, and Bangladesh and Pakistan, but it recoils at the thought of the political division of the southern sub-continent of Africa. The proposed British formula for Northern Ireland (Ulster) is based on the premise that Ulster's continued separate existence from the Irish Republic (Eire) can only be changed by the majority of Ulster's Irish (where there is a Protestant majority) and not by a majority of the Irish of all Ireland (Eire plus Ulster) which has a Catholic majority. Majority rule for the Irish island has therefore, for all practical purposes, been ruled out: the Irish Catholic minority in Ulster can therefore not call upon an Irish Catholic majority in all Ireland to change a Protestant majority in Ulster into a Protestant majority in all Ireland. Proportional representation has been proposed for the new Ulster assembly, i.e. two separate political communities are formally acknowledged, not on an ethnic or racial or cultural basis, but purely on a religious basis. This shows how absolutely nonsensical it is to force an integrated dispensation on the White nation of South Africa. One might as well expect the Middle East problem, particularly the Palestinian

occurred in several parts of the world, notably Africa. (South African laws, no different in substance to those proposed by the UN, have existed since 1913.) Yet the UN stands in favour of plural societies cannot be enforced anywhere in the world as evidenced by the acts of genocide by the minority Tutsi against the majority Bantu in Barundi and "Africanisation" in Uganda (i.e. the elimination and absorption of the Asians). Thus the problem with the integration model is its total lack of genuine security even for ethnic majorities, not to speak of minorities.

13. A major obstacle to the successful implementation of the integration model in South Africa is the question of land. In present-day South Africa the Black man's historical territories are protected by law. They may not be purchased by Whites. In the homelands White men may not set up any business on a permanent basis. According to the integration model, anyone should be able to buy land at the going price, anywhere in the country, and set up business and industry where it pays him to do so. Because of the immense economic lead, entrepreneurial skill and buying power of the White nation, the Indians and the Coloured community, the chances are that within a few decades there would be no independent Black farmers and no Black landowners to speak of. This is tantamount to consciously breeding frustration and, eventually, hostility on an enormous scale. Even a superficial glance at the histories of the US, Alaska, Australia, Canada and New Zealand will reveal how the Red Indian, Eskimo, Aborigines and Maoris fared in a free-for-all society. In the US, Australia and New Zealand successive governments in the post-war period had to tighten laws to protect these minorities against loss of their lands.

14. Whenever integration suffers a

setback elsewhere in the world its advocates will defend the model they propose for South Africa on the ground that it is geared to South Africa's unique circumstances and should not be judged by events in other parts of the world. However, it is only human that setbacks elsewhere, causing misery and conflict will create profound unease and seriously undermine morale among those South Africans who would be involved in the integration model. The futility of large-scale busing of children of different races to integrated schools in the US to improve education is now generally recognised in that country. The published studies of Professor Christopher Jencks and associates at the Harvard Graduate School of Education and that of Professor David J. Armor, also of Harvard, can be cited as evidence. A 1969-1972 study financed by the Nova Scotia and Federal Government in Canada and conducted by the Halifax-based Dalhousie University Institute of Public Affairs found that integration of Negro and White family housing areas was a social failure and did not effect significant and positive social change among its members. In a geo-political context, the Dutch agro-economist Dr Sicco Mansholt, President of the European Economic Commission until 1973, said that "for the great mass of the population there has been no broad improvement in conditions in the last 20 years of European integration". Dr Mansholt said that "the progress of integration has led to major social stresses" and "the disparities in standards of living between different areas of the community have become more marked rather than less". Deliberate social integration and integration on the geo-political level have had major setbacks in practically all plurally-structured countries of the world. For example, the influx of non-Whites into traditional White areas in Europe has led governments and society

to react in a way hardly encouraging to the protagonists of the integration model. Considering that the pattern of human relations in South Africa is vastly more difficult and complex, it can be emphasised once more that these setbacks are bound to have a far greater impact on South Africans, rendering successful implementation of the integration model virtually impossible.

15. A further problem with the integration model is its implied rejection of the role of physical (racial) differences as an important factor in human and group relations. In fact, the integration model can only be said to have a good chance of acceptance and success if pronounced physical differences did not matter at all. It would be a very naive politician and a very ignorant student of sociology who would deny that racial differences exist and an equally naive individual who argued that even if such differences existed, they would have no bearing on group relations. It is one matter to argue that these differences *should* not affect social behaviour, and the South African Government agrees that in strict theory these differences ought not to play a role. But the reality of inter-group relations proves that they play a very important part in determining group relations, not only in South Africa, but elsewhere in the world. The intelligent mind does not boggle at the idea of people, either individually or collectively, being influenced in their relationship by clearly discernible physical differences between races. There are relatively few suitors in the world who will say that outward physical appearance does not play a major role in the selection of his mate. The White and Black populations in South Africa, like people elsewhere, are not immune to the selective influence of pronounced physical characteristics; moreover it would be patently unfair to expect them to be immune. Considering

the pronounced and distinctive bodily differences between the White and Black South African it is quite natural that these differences will function as a primary selective force in cross-racial relations. In fact, each major racial group in the world is influenced, consciously and sub-consciously, by a stereotype mental image comprising those traits deemed normal or average for the group concerned. The model or stereotype regulates the degree of cross-racial association that individuals of the group collectively, will tolerate. This is not peculiar to South Africa. In his work *The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations*, the Dutch sociologist, H. Hoetink, gives a thorough description of the selective role racial differences play in Caribbean societies. Unless the proponents of the integration model can succeed in convincing the White and Black population of South Africa that racial differences play an insignificant role in group relations the model will never be able to operate effectively. The perpetuation of racially determined group patterns will persist. As Professor Christopher Sagley pointed out in his article "Pluralism, Development and Social Conflict in Africa" (in *Plural Societies*, The Hague, Summer 1972), competition between ethnic groups all over Africa is rife and "it will take generations before the existing rigid block organisation may break down".

16. The problem in dealing with a strident socio-political problem is that it is the *current*, not the unborn generation which needs to be convinced of the *direction of policy*, the short-term effects and the ultimate pattern of inter-group relations. It would be totally unrealistic to measure the socio-political realities of *our day* against norms which might acquire a definite validity and rationale perhaps only after several generations. To succeed, the integration

model would have to recast social behaviour into an idealistically-orientated mould, i.e. apply the norms of an idealised and untested future to existing socio-political realities. Consequently, in order to provide the integration model with a natural impetus, current attitudes in South Africa would have to alter drastically, almost totally. Whereas this would be possible in the case of thousands in South Africa — perhaps hundreds of thousands — the remaining millions cannot be wished away.

17. The integration model would violate the time honoured right of nations to determine which elements it wants to assimilate. There is no record among civilised peoples of a single major political or international treaty charter or concord comprising a directive or injunction prescribing to any nation or ethnic group what its basic cultural and genetic composition and structure should be. Bringing pressure to bear on a people to assimilate basically disparate elements, simply to serve the interests of other parties, is patently immoral, cruel and contrary to the fundamental tenets of modern civilised behaviour. Some of the democracies of the West may argue (from the safety of their relatively homogeneous societies) that such pressure may be essential to attain harmonious group development in South Africa. However, in adopting this line — a highly debatable one — they compromise and undermine their own credibility. Democracy consists of people having a say in the affairs of their own ethno-national group, not in those of others. Who can deny that in the integration model the Zulu will have a say in the affairs of the White nation and the Tswana in those of the Zulu? The President of Tanzania, Dr Julius Nyerere, an outspoken and known advocate of African unity, recently admitted in an article justifying his recognition of Biafran

independence that regional or continental unity cannot be enforced arbitrarily or procured artificially since it would mean that people would have to sacrifice their identities to the point of extinction. If the integration model is to have a chance of success it will have to be forced to the existing population. Not only will this be rejected by the major groups but the consequences will probably be chaotic.

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In view of the points raised above, it is clear that the alternative to a policy of separate ethno-national development must necessarily be *arbitrary and artificial* integration.

However, the negative consequences of a policy of integration will overshadow those emanating from the current policy of separate development. The chances of chaos are infinitely greater. The obstacles to success built into the integration model are far greater than those of separate development which recognises realities such as *natural* divisions between peoples, the role of *historical* forces in group formation, and existing geo-political arrangements. What is of crucial importance is that, once introduced, the integration model cannot be unscrambled whereas in the case of separate development it leaves each ethno-national group the option to negotiate a federal partnership or confederal relationship with one or more of the other groups. Under separate development, too, each party will be able to negotiate on equal political terms and not as an impotent minority as will be the case in an integration system.

It is often argued that separate development, in order to succeed, requires enormous sacrifices and can result in hardship, misery and unhappiness. The South African Government concedes

that successful implementation will require great sacrifices and enormous adjustments. However, these sacrifices and adjustments do not begin to compare with those required for the implementation of integration.

The final reality which the proponents of integration will have to face is the attitude of the vast majority of the White nation, irrespective of party political affiliation. The South African Whites constitute a nation in its own right and their belief in self-determination, the maintenance of their identity, together with the will to fight for these beliefs, constitute the rationale of their opposition to integration. In this respect they do not differ one iota from other nations. When the Israeli leader Shimon Peres was asked why the Israeli people were not prepared to form a single nation with the Palestine Arabs he replied: "We don't want a bi-national state . . . We will not compromise the character of Israel, which is the only state in the world for Jewish people". Another prominent Israeli leader, Dr Nahum Goldmann, former Zionist President, said that the perception of the Jews in the Soviet Union was not in the usual meaning of anti-semitism "but to deny them the right to live their own life religiously, nationally and culturally and to maintain their identity as Jews". The basic principles enunciated in these pronouncements are one hundred per cent transferable to the White nation in South Africa.

As far as the Whites are concerned an unqualified democratic dispensation, implying a one-man one-vote system for the whole of South Africa, will simply mean that the Black masses, many of whom are still illiterate and primitive by Western standards, will — by sheer weight of numbers — determine the way of life and value system that will prevail in the country.

The integration model pursues the

by a gradual transition to one-man one-vote. On attaining political supremacy the phased and transitional process to majority rule agreed upon earlier will almost immediately be abandoned in favour of a one-man one-vote system, followed by Africanisation and, in some cases, nationalisation of White property. Would the Black man in South Africa act any differently?

The theoretical objectives of the integration model cannot be achieved in South Africa. Human dignity has become the central theme in the crusade to force South Africa to abandon its policy of separate ethnic development in favour of integration. Separate development, so it is alleged, is an affront to human dignity, and its aims an assault on human values. The proponents of separate development deny this. To them, human dignity can only be achieved — in a multinational society — when each group has attained self-determination. Within his group each individual can then achieve his own success or make his own mistakes — but never at the expense of other groups. Human equality does not imply ethnic equality in terms of socio-economic and political development. Only an ignoramus would argue that there is this type of equality between the Swedes and the Kalahari Bushmen. In an ethnically heterogeneous population, therefore, majority rule (which for the proponents of the integration model is synonymous with human dignity) will mean that a minority group, in the long run, has to change its customs and abandon its culture and vested political interests in order to accommodate the culture, life-style and political needs of a purely numerically determined majority group. In terms of the integration model the government could therefore be faced with the choice of either violating the humanitarian principle of equal rights for all individuals, or tolerating the suppres-

sion of one or more minority ethnic groups. Both opinions will have embarrassing and negative results for such a government. Consequently, to apply the integration model to South Africa, with its peculiar population structure, would be to invite a conflict of egalitarian theory and ethnic reality.

To summarise, the proponents of integration for South Africa will find it virtually impossible to sell their programme to Black, White, Indian or Coloured. They may be able to convince individuals and smaller groups but not the majority of each group. In addition, the obstacles to the acceptance and implementation of the integration model are real, not theoretical. Realising the defects of the integration model, the government and its supporters have chosen separate development, a policy based on hard core socio-political realities. They are opposed, implacably and resolutely, to the integration model whose possible merits can only be measured in terms of abstract theory — and even in theory the integration model is based on a misconception of man's socio-political imperatives.

In spite of all South Africa's efforts to prove its *bona fides*, advocates of ethnic integration are today more than ever before questioning the basic assumption concerning the rationale and objectives of separate development. In the process, though, they too argue from certain assumptions that are questionable. The most important is that separate development (in its broad philosophical context) amounts to a *static* or non-evolutionary socio-political system, devoid of the adaptive potential needed for viability in a rapidly changing world. But they have only to compare the "apartheid" of today with that of 1948 to realise that this system does indeed have vast adaptive potential.

Integrationists who point out that a viable and equitable system of separate development *must be seen to be working* usually fail to perceive meaningful progress because they employ a chronological yardstick that fails to take into account that implementation of the programme will, of necessity, be a long-term operation. Integrationists are inclined to adopt the "camera" approach to separate development: their image represents a single photographic record, misleadingly simple because it shows no growth and no movement in either time or space. And quite often their photographic records are outdated, misleadingly "angled" and selective, oversimplified and incapable of portraying a "total situation".

The fact that the policy of separate development presupposes changes within a complex socio-political system as well as a complex pattern of inter-group relations, cancels out any hope of the policy being executed in slot machine fashion. Asian students of demography bewail the snail's pace at which birth control campaigns are progressing back home. Many have said it would require "several generations" for these programmes to attain a satisfactory measure of success. If such a long time was required for the successful implementation of a family planning campaign, how much more time would be needed to resolve the vastly more complex problems that directly or indirectly affect the day to day existence of every single person in South Africa. Unrealistic ploys, short-cuts and pious and moral indignation are no substitutes for steady development and evolutionary adjustments.

Integrationists should also not use as their criterion the South African Government's handling of separate development at the present juncture. One must differentiate between separate

development as a broad socio-political philosophy and the policy that is being implemented by a particular government at a particular juncture in time. The two are not necessarily the same. The former will be viable only if it is sufficiently flexible and if it embodies sufficient adaptive potential to meet the inescapable demands of evolving history. This is the case. It is also amazing what great adaptations people will make if pressurised by the circumstances of hard-core realities. The Whites, and therefore their policy of separate development, have sufficient adaptive potential to allow the peoples of Southern Africa to reconcile their hard-core interests within a workable socio-political system.

Also debatable is the integrationists' assumption that because race and colour differences have historically constituted an important motivational force in the development of the system of separate development, they will in future continue to do so. The cultural and socio-political differences between the two main racial groups of South Africa have always clearly corresponded with colour polarisation. The average White has consequently been conditioned to associate differences with race, or colour differences and vice versa. The wide gap between the relevant groups in terms of level of civilisation and socio-political development has thus for generations imbued the dominant society with a sharp colour consciousness. And this is a psycho-social reality which will not evaporate overnight.

Every nation decides for itself whom it wants to assimilate socio-politically and whom it wants to absorb into its power structure. This explains why the US, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand refuses to open their doors to millions of Asians — despite moral pressure on these countries to do so for humanitarian reasons. The foreign policies

of nations are not primarily attuned to furthering the interests of other parties. The crux of the matter is assimilability and it is merely co-incidental that in South Africa socio-cultural disparity and colour differences overlap so significantly. The greater the vulnerability of a nation in terms of survival rating, the stricter the selective processes involved in cross-cultural assimilation. There is no historical precedent of a nation voluntarily relinquishing the right to determine who should be assimilated.

The South African Government has never denied that there are supporters of separate development who have ingrained prejudices against assimilation with other races. But only a person existing in a socio-cultural vacuum can be completely free of prejudice or preference. Preference is a natural concomitant of inter-personal and inter-group relations, though it does not have to lead necessarily to overt acts of discrimination. It is therefore naive to expect White South Africans to handle ethnic relations with mechanical objectivity or to become indifferent and non-discriminatory in the handling of their basic group interests. The only nations who until now have acted to the contrary have been those incapable of taking the initiative to determine their own survival. What is more, are the White population's prejudices — relative to South African circumstances — really stronger than the prejudice which exists, for instance, in the relationship between Jew and Arab?

For the foreseeable future separate development will inevitably be tied up with colour and race. But this is no infallible proof that colour or race is the basic generative power behind the policy. The colour and racial factors are still prominently in evidence because the boundaries of race, colour and culture overlap so distinctly. As the policy of separate *ethno-national* development evolves,

race and colour *per se* will no doubt progressively become a less predominant determinant in inter-group relations.

Swiss naturalisation and immigration laws have their greatest impact on European neighbours such as the Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese. Britain's Commonwealth Immigrants Act, again, mainly affects non-Whites. Why? For the simple reason that the Commonwealth is preponderantly non-White. If, in South Africa, Mexicans, Pakistanis, Indians, West Indians and Chinese were substituted for the Blacks, White South Africa would still resort to certain differential measures in order to safeguard its identity and vested interests.

It is essential to put the matter of national survival — and the role of differentiation directed at "out-groups" — in its true perspective. Modern nations are more subtle than their historical counterparts in their application of techniques of differentiation. However, the struggle centred on the protection and promotion of self-interest remains basic. Events in Rwanda, Burundi, Vietnam, the Middle East, Sudan and Nigeria emphasise to what lengths nations are prepared to venture in order to promote or protect their interests.

The crystallisation of a group of independent ethno-national states in the southern sub-continent of Africa is, therefore, reconcilable with current historical and socio-political trends. It is necessary to repeat that whereas the UN, at its inception in 1945, comprised 51 members, it now has 135 members of which the vast majority have appeared on the scene since World War Two as new nation-states; several are remnants of abortive attempts at political integration in the West Indies, Malaysia, British Central Africa, etc.

In terms of the policy of separate development, the precise framework of

political independence coupled with economic co-operation and inter-dependence will be determined by the unique combination of historical, political, economic and ethnic realities of Southern Africa, and not by universalised clichés, like one-man one-vote, which glibly promise instant and complete solutions in the complex and tricky field of inter-group relations.

BASIC DATA

Geographical Location and General Topography: South Africa lies at the southern extremity of the African continent, with the Atlantic and Indian Oceans meeting at its southernmost tip. With a surface area of 222 543 km² and coastline of 2 954 km, it is more than five times larger than Britain. Its general physiographical appearance can be likened to an inverted saucer with a high central plateau rising steeply on the east and south-east, sloping gradually to the west coast, encircling a vast interior plateau with an average elevation exceeding 1 200 metres (4 000 feet).

Rainfall and Climate: South Africa has a summer rainfall with the exception of the south-western coastal area which has a winter rainfall and a Mediterranean type climate, and a strip along the south coast which normally receives rain at all seasons. In general, rainfall decreases from east to west, exceeding 1 000 mm (40 inches) along the east coast and decreasing gradually to less than 125 mm (5 inches) annually in the west coast areas. The mean annual rainfall is 444 mm (17½ inches). South Africa lies almost entirely within the southern temperate zone, between 22°S and 35°S. Recorded temperature readings range from 12°C to 32°C. The average number of sunshine hours varies from 7,5 to 9,5 compared with 3,8 in London and 6,9 in New York.

Central Government: The Republic of South Africa (prior to 31 May 1961, the Union of South Africa) is an independent nation-state and a founder member of the United Nations. The legal system is based on Roman Dutch Law, amended by British law. Its political institutions are modelled on the British parliamentary system. The Constitution closely resembles the British Constitution, from which it derives historically. The State President is the Head of State and acts on the advice of the Prime Minister, the leader of the majority party in Parliament. The South African Parliament is a bicameral institution comprising a 54-member Senate (constituted by indirect election and direct nomination) and the House of Assembly (whose 166 members are elected on a basis of universal franchise every five years). In general, the two-party system obtains. At the present juncture (January 1974), three parties are represented in Parliament: the governing National Party (118 members), the United Party (47 members), and the Progressive Party (1 member). Legislative power is vested in Parliament; executive power in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, with the present Ministry consisting of 18 ministers (including the Prime Minister) and six deputy ministers. The Judiciary is independent of both the Legislative and Executive. Cape Town is the legislative and Pretoria the administrative capital. South Africa has two official languages, Afrikaans and English.

POPULATION COMPOSITION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA BASED ON AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1970 POPULATION CENSUS

WHITES	ASIANS	COLOURED	BANTU
3 751 300	620 400	1 509 000	Zulu 4 026 000
			Xhosa (Transkei) 3 005 000
			Tswana 1 719 400
			North Sotho 1 603 900
			South Sotho 1 451 800
			Xhosa (Ciskei) 924 000
			Shangaan 737 200
			Swazi 498 700
			Ndebele 414 800
			Venda 357 900
			Other 318 200
Total Population: 21 448 200			

MIGRATION (1 000)

	1960	1970	1971
Immigrants	9,8	41,5	35,8
Emigrants	12,6	9,2	8,3

EMPLOYMENT (all races)

Total (1 000)	1 635	2 455	2 522,0
Mining (1 000)	593	657	648,0
Private Manufacturing (1 000)	658	1 164	1 203,0
Construction (1 000)	126	356	384,0
Transport and Communications (1 000)	258	278*	287,0*

SALARIES AND WAGES

Total (R million)	1 142,3	3 024,5*	3 385,9*
Mining	226,1	399,1	416,0
Manufacturing	577,7	1 609,2	1 820,3
Construction	74,5	436,6	501,8*
Transport and Communications	264,0	579,6*	647,8

UNEMPLOYMENT (1 000)

Registered Unemployed (excl. Bantu)	25,7	8,5	8,6
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CONSTRUCTION

Building Plans approved (R million)	192,8	813,0	850,0
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FOREIGN TRADE

Imports (R million)	1 124	2 578	2 884,0
Exports (excl. gold) (R million)	881	1 420	1 531,0

GOLD SALES

(R million)	536,0	830,3	892,8
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TRANSPORT

Railway Income (R million)	401,4	889,0	670,6
New Motor Vehicles registered (1 000)	118,0	250,8	267,2

* Estimated.

HOME LANGUAGE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN POPULATION*

POPULATION UNIT	HOME LANGUAGE	%	POPULATION UNIT	HOME LANGUAGE	%
WHITE NATION	Afrikaans	58,0	ASIAN COMMUNITY	Afrikaans	1,8
	English	37,1		English	14,4
	Afrikaans & English	1,6		Tamil	29,7
	Dutch	0,7		Gujarati	11,3
	German	1,0		Hindu	26,4
	Yiddish	0,2		Telegu	7,2
	Greek	0,3		Urdu	7,5
	Italian	0,4		Other Indian	0,4
	Portuguese	0,3		Chinese	1,0
	Other	0,4		Other	0,4
Total	100,0	Total	100,0		
COLOURED COMMUNITY	Afrikaans	88,6	BANTU PEOPLES	Xhosa	28,0
	English	10,1		Zulu	26,2
	Afrikaans & English	1,0		South Sotho	11,8
	Other	0,3		Tswana	10,5
	Total	100,0		Sepedi	8,8
					Shangaan
			Swazi	3,1	
			Ndebele	2,7	
			Venda	2,2	
			Other	2,1	
			Total	100,0	

*Republic of South Africa, Department of Statistics: South African Statistics, 1968.

BANTU HOMELANDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

OFFICIAL NAME OF EACH HOMELAND AND ITS PEOPLE	CAPITAL	TERRITORY IN HECTARE	1970 POPULATION ('000)	LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (YEARS IN WHICH STATUS WAS ATTAINED)	CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SELF-GOVERNMENT
1. Transkei (Xhosa)	Umtata	3 672 212	3 006	1963	1963
2. Ciskei (Xhosa)	Zwellitsha	918 547	924	1971	1972
3. KwaZulu (Zulu)	Nongoma ¹	3 144 321	4 026	1972	--
4. Lebowa (North Sotho)	Sheshego	2 214 086	2 019 ³	1971	1972
5. Venda (Vhavenda)	Sibasa	504 355	358	1971	1973
6. Gazankulu (Shangaan/Tsonga)	Giyani	667 292	737	1971	1973
7. Bophuthatswana (Tswana)	Mafeking ²	3 754 018	1 719	1971	1972
8. Qwaqwa (South Sotho)	Qwaqwa	45 742	1 452	1971	--
9. Swazi Territory (Swazi)	Nyamasane	211 807	499	--	--

¹Capital to be transferred to Ulundi
²Capital to be transferred to Heystekrand
³De jure population includes about 415 000 Ndebele-speaking people
 SOURCE: Africa Institute, Pretoria.

1 hectare = 2,471 acres
 100 hectare = 1km² = 0,386 sq. miles

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